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Since the early 1990s, North Korean nuclear policy has been notorious for its brinkmanship — 
using provocative acts and inflammatory rhetoric to escalate tensions in ways that either enhance 
Pyongyang's power or its diplomatic leverage. This was illustrated in the August 2003 six party 
talks in Beijing when they announced their intention to conduct a nuclear test. The new round of 
talks launched in February 2004 creates the opportunity for North Korea to continue this trend, or 
to change directions. While many fear North Korea's use of brinkmanship techniques is part of an 
aggressive stance that will lead to war, that perception is doubtful. North Korea's frequent 
redefinition of a nuclear brink's demarcation has another viable purpose: Pyongyang's goal is not 
to go over the brink, but to be pulled back from the brink.  
The Goals of North Korean Brinkmanship 
Many wonder why North Korea, given its dismal societal condition and famines that seem to 
augur regime collapse, behaves in a reckless manner that encourages U.S. hard liners to 
contemplate regime change in this "axis of evil" member. Often the conclusion reached is that this 
behavior is calculated to induce the United States to acquiesce to North Korean blackmail: 
Rescue us on our terms, or else! Although that contention is plausible, it is more likely that North 
Korea is motivated by a more sophisticated model of an external rescue that may pose additional 
problems for U.S. policy toward Korea.  
 
Pyongyang's brinkmanship is not a distracting tactic in a larger war-fighting strategy. Instead it is 
an essential element of a strategy designed to create two results. The first result is a form of 
interim deterrence against what they perceive as U.S. brinkmanship — the world's sole 
superpower applying a preemptive doctrine toward a cluster of rogue states and terrorists. North 
Korea's aggressive policy is designed to compensate for their manifest weaknesses and to keep 
U.S. military capabilities off balance. The second goal is to set the stage for external diplomatic 
and economic intervention that will pull the confrontational U.S.-North Korea parties away from 
the brink and act as a catalyst to negotiated reunification of North and South Korea. Increasingly 
the most likely candidate to fill that international role is China because of its ties to both Koreas, 
its ability to play such a role in Asian regional affairs, and — as long as PRC-US interests vis-à-
vis North Korea appear to overlap — its means to persuade Americans that this would be in the 
United States' best interests.  
China's Growing Role 
This North Korean use of brinkmanship is a perverse way of facilitating an amicable negotiated 
resolution of North Korea's myriad problems as part of an inter- Korean confidence building 
process that will lead to co-existence and incremental reunification. North Koreans are well aware 
that the younger generation of South Koreans are avid supporters of peaceful reconciliation. 
What both Koreas require is a mutual benefactor that is perceived to be neutral. Despite China's 
Cold War ties to North Korea, today the PRC fits that balanced bill more than any other country 
— including the United States.  
 
This was well illustrated by the visit of one of the PRC's top leaders, Wu Bang-guo, to Pyongyang 
in October 2003 during which he conducted negotiations with Kim Jong-il to revive the six-party 
talks. The later announcement of rescheduled multilateral talks in Beijing was welcomed by 
Seoul. Whether or not the series of talks held in Beijing yield demonstrable progress, it is 
symbolic of China's role in Korean affairs that the venue for the attempt to resolve the nuclear 
issue is the "Beijing talks." Not many South Koreans think a comparably high level U.S. official 
would be tasked with such a mission because of the hardline predisposition of the Bush 
administration. The PRC's inter-Korean leverage also is demonstrated by China's rise to the 
status of the ROK's largest economic partner, South Korea's position as the PRC's second 
ranking foreign economic partner, and by China's encouragement of the DPRK to emulate the 
brand of capitalist reforms that Chinese communists have so successfully embraced.  
 
Yet another China-related factor in the evolution of inter-Korean affairs is the way North Korea 
seems to have learned a perverse lesson from the United States' policy of strategic ambiguity 
regarding support of Taiwan in its relationship with the PRC. Pyongyang uses a creative version 
of strategic ambiguity that takes advantage of the gaps in South Korean and Japanese policies 
toward North Korea in a manner that enhances the DPRK's form of diplomatic deterrence vis-à-
vis the United States.  
South Korea's Shifting Position 
If events surrounding the Korean peninsula continue to evolve in this manner, the United States 
had better prepare itself to cope with the processes and the results. That challenge is 
exacerbated by the ways the ROK under President Roh Moo-hyun is reemphasizing the brand of 
independent foreign policy that he stressed in his Fall 2002 election campaign. South Korean 
resistance to harder line U.S. approaches to North Korea is compounded by anxieties about 
Japanese acquiescence to that approach. The prospects for meaningful U.S.-ROK-Japan 
trilateral cooperation are not helped by South Korean perceptions of the utility of the PRC in the 
inter-Korean context versus the roles of the United States and Japan in that context.  
 
The emphasis on South Korean "independence" is intensified by two factors. Most evident are the 
tensions stemming from progressive South Koreans' perceptions that the U.S. armed forces' 
transformation plans will have a negative impact upon the existing level of inter-Korean strategic 
stability. These Koreans fear these shifts that are supposed to be motivated by worldwide 
transformation of U.S. forces in the War on Terrorism actually are part of a U.S. effort to set the 
stage for a preemptive attack on North Korea or some other move aimed at coercive regime 
change. These fears are behind recent public opinion polling that indicates more South Koreans 
think the United States poses a serious threat to their security than North Korea does by a 39% to 
33% ratio. These liberal South Koreans, who are President Roh's core political constituency, also 
resent the level of pressure Washington put on Seoul to commit forces in Iraq. These critics are 
ambiguous about the United States, wanting to be seen as a reliable ally of the U.S. purposes in 
Iraq in order to assure that the United States will remain reliable in support of ROK purposes in 
the Korean peninsula, but not wanting to be seen as an abjectly obedient ally. This attitude is due 
to widespread Korean sensitivity to playing an excessively deferential follower's role behind a 
strong-willed leader — thereby conforming to a sadaejui (flunkeyism) paradigm. Both of these 
factors reinforce rising Korean nationalism and desires for greater South Korean independence 
from U.S. international guidance. 
 
These internal pressures for a more assertive stance versus U.S. leadership in the ROK-U.S. 
alliance relationship could help reinforce a long-standing North Korean ambition to drive a wedge 
between their southern rival and its strategic benefactor. This, too, has been part of North Korea's 
brinkmanship approach — in terms of making radical statements, sending signals that they are 
prepared to carry out reckless policies, and behaving in what appears to be an irrational manner 
— that are collectively intended to be perceived differently by Americans and South Koreans.  
How Crazy is North Korea? 
It is common for U.S. observers of North Korea, especially foreign and defense policy pundits 
who are not Korea specialists, to react to such North Korean rhetoric, threats, and demeanor by 
describing the Pyongyang regime as a bastion of lunatics. If South Koreans were to take all these 
facets of North Korea at face value, they too would question the sanity of Kim Jong-il and his elite 
cohort. Of course, some South Koreans do see the DPRK's leaders and their posturing precisely 
that way — thereby reinforcing those Americans who perceive North Koreans as stark raving mad 
and fear the consequences for regional stability. On balance, however, more South Koreans 
grasp the nuances of North Korea's peculiar behavior and understand that it almost certainly 
amounts to what can be considered a form of calculated irrationality that is intended to engender 
anxiety among North Korea's adversaries and thereby enhance the DPRK's geopolitical 
deterrence, compensating for its evident vulnerabilities. The divergent perception of South 
Koreans and Americans reinforces the value of "calculated irrationality" as part of Pyongyang's 
brinkmanship approach because it simultaneously provides diplomatic leverage against the 
United States' strategic posture in East Asia and exacerbates frictions within the U.S.-ROK 
relationship. If North Korea's leaders are "crazy," it is because they understand the wisdom 
behind the saying "crazy like a fox." 
 
This situation helps to underscore China's growing role and potentials as a mediator and 
facilitator in the inter-Korean context because the type of perceptual gap that is increasingly 
evident in U.S.-ROK bilateral relations does not constitute a significant factor in ROK-PRC 
relations. Instead of characterizing North Korean haranguing and posturing the way so many 
Americans do — as certifiably crazy — South Koreans and Chinese tend to agree that these 
rants and gestures are the result of North Korea's fears and the systemic vulnerabilities that lead 
to such angst. Also, Seoul and Beijing can grasp the pragmatic utility of the resulting 
brinkmanship. Instead of reacting adversely to these circumstances in a threatening manner, 
Seoul and Beijing increasingly respond to them by consulting with each other and trying to devise 
means that will cause the DPRK to alter its way of thinking and acting. 
 
Adding yet another layer of intricacy to this situation for the next several months is the opportunity 
provided to North Korea by the confluence of domestic politics in both South Korea and the 
United States and the impact international events may have on both countries' political evolution. 
South Korea's National Assembly elections in April and the United States' presidential and 
congressional elections in November present distinct opportunities for North Korean 
brinkmanship. The South Korean situation is the most obvious. The more North Korea provokes 
United States' reactions that motivate support for those Assembly candidates who resist U.S. 
pressures on the ROK to conform in Korea and the Middle East, the more likely it is that the 
resulting South Korean government will be supportive of Roh's brand of engagement with North 
Korea. This government would be in a stronger position to get the United States to cooperate on 
that agenda. North Korea can also hope that its brinkmanship will have a similar impact on the 
U.S. elections by raising the soundness of U.S. policy toward North Korean WMD as a partisan 
campaign issue. The Democratic candidate could then create an alternative to the Bush 
administration's policies — an alternative that would be more attractive to the Roh administration. 
Since this would occur in the midst of existing U.S.-ROK frictions over the soundness of U.S. 
policy and in the thick of American and South Korean progressives' criticism of the Bush 
Doctrine's risks for other questionable conflicts, it is clear why North Korean purveyors of 
brinkmanship would see the situation as ripe. Depending on how the ROK and U.S. elections turn 
out from a North Korean perspective, there could be aggravation of the U.S.-ROK policy gap or 
some convergence in U.S.-ROK policy toward enhanced engagement with the DPRK. Any such 
outcome would be useful for North Korean purposes and strengthens Pyongyang's motives for 
further brinkmanship. 
Assessment 
North Korean creative brinkmanship seriously compounds the United States' problems on the 
Korean peninsula by undercutting the ability of the U.S.-ROK strategic partnership to cope with 
North Korea at the same time South Korea's more assertive roles within the U.S.-ROK-PRC and 
U.S.-ROK-Japan triangular relationships evolve in ways that raise new questions about long term 
trends. South Korea wants its closer ties with China to be acknowledged by U.S. and Japanese 
policy makers in a more creative manner. Arguably the best way for the United States to become 
more effective in coping with the prospect that responding to North Korea's brinkmanship could 
yield a China-focused outcome, complicated by South Korean "independencism," is to pay far 
more attention than it presently does to South Korean ideas about how to handle North Korea. 
There are many research centers in South Korea that focus on such aspects of crisis 
management and confidence building measures versus North Korea, and China's role as a 
potential intermediary. The ideas spawned in these South Korean centers could be more 
thoroughly integrated within U.S. policy if Americans paid more attention to them in a systematic 
institutionalized fashion. One bureaucratic option to accomplish that level of policy coordination 
would be to create a joint U.S.-ROK governmental research institute tasked with enhancing our 
shared appreciation for the nuances in peacefully dealing with North Korea and for coping with 
the results of either success or failure.  
 
It would be premature to spell out precisely what kind of institution the United States should 
create. That can best be determined through consultations between the United States and South 
Korea, perhaps in the form of a conference or workshop focused on this issue. The more the 
United States does to cooperate with our South Korean counterparts on such an agenda, the 
more likely it will lead to success — not failure. Clearly this would be a better way to cope with the 
nuances of North Korean brinkmanship, deal with China's growing influence, come to terms with 
Korean nationalism, and — most important — avoid the risks of accidentally falling over the brink 
into a nuclear catastrophe. 
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